Understanding the potential of Self-Protection Jamming on board of miniature UAVs by Ilioudis, Christos V. et al.
Understanding the potential of Self-Protection
Jamming on board of miniature UAVs
Christos V. Ilioudis, Carmine Clemente and John Soraghan
Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering
University of Strathclyde Glasgow, UK
Email: {c.ilioudis, carmine.clemente, j.soraghan}@strath.ac.uk
Abstract—Unarmed Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems are very
challenging targets due to their small size and ability to fly in
low altitudes and speed. Particularly, in radar systems UAVs can
exhibit similar radar cross section and Doppler parameters to
clutter returns such as birds and trees. For this reason, often
the micro-Doppler signature of the detected target is employed
as discriminative characteristic. This work aims to examine
micro-Doppler jamming solutions that could be implemented on
board of miniature UAV platforms in order to deploy electronic
countermeasures to radar sensors, with the aim to provide useful
information to the radar community to counter these.
Index Terms—Jamming; micro-Doppler; Unarmed Aerial Ve-
hicle; Electronic Warfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Miniature UAVs, usually refereed to as micro-Drone or simply
Drones, have become a target of high importance for both
security and defence systems. Even so, Drones are very
challenging targets, considered as invisible to the current
radars used for air traffic control [1]. There are three main
characteristics Drones exhibit that make them hard to moni-
tor, especially when using radar systems. Starting with their
physical characteristics, commercial Drones have small size
and prevalence of non electrically conductive materials in their
structure resulting in low radar reflectivity [2]. Moreover, such
platforms are able to fly at low speed and altitude, making
them easily to be confused with static or slow-moving clutter
such as trees [3]. In addition, Drones are highly manoeuvrable
thus confusing tracking algorithms designed for larger air-
crafts. These peculiar features have led to the design of radar
sensors with specific modes, such as continuous steering and
holographic radar in order to deal with the small radar cross
section (RCS) and clutter mitigation [4].
Due to their similarities in size and speed with non-
manmade targets such as birds and trees, in the literature
Drones are mainly discriminated by their micro-Doppler sig-
natures [2]. Particularly, a flying Drone can be characterised
by two motions: the main motion due to its centre of mass
moving from a point to another, and the secondary motions
that its rotors blades exhibit. Those secondary motions are
generally periodical and introduce secondary Doppler com-
ponents generally referred to as micro-Doppler effect [5].
Micro-Doppler has been widely used for classification in a
variety of targets including ballistic and helicopter targets [6]–
[8]. Through the last years, different techniques and system
configurations exploiting micro-Doppler have been proposed
in the literature for Drone detection and classification [2].
Electronic countermeasures (ECM) are based on intentional
emissions designed to interfere with the radar’s ability to mon-
itor one or multiple targets. In the literature, numerous ECM
techniques have been proposed [9], [10], however they mostly
fall into two categories: noise and deceptive jamming. Noise
jamming refers to systems that generate interference signals
with aim to mask the target’s reflected signal completely [9].
In contrast, the objective of deceptive jamming is to modify the
transmitted signal in order to confuse the radar into detecting
and tracking false targets or even cancelling the reflected signal
[10]. Being an important discriminative feature, incorporation
of micro-Doppler in deception jamming has been previously
investigated in the literature [11]–[14]. Particularly, in [11] the
effect of micro-motion feature deception in inverse synthetic
aperture images (ISAR) was investigated. In [12] a micro-
Doppler jamming signal generation scheme was proposed
while simple target examples were also provided. Additionally
the authors in [13] and [14] proposed a method of deceptive
jamming for tracked vehicles with simulated results comparing
the proposed with non micro-motion jamming.
Existing Drone detection solutions on the market are de-
signed assuming that these platforms are not performing elec-
tronic counter measures actions to avoid detection. However,
this option becomes more realistic with the availability of
smaller, lighter and cheaper RF transceivers based on software
defined radio (SDR) and that can be easily carried by a Drone.
This work aims to examine the capabilities of such ECM
systems by proposing a jamming waveform system and in-
vestigating its performance through simulations, with the final
objective to provide to the radar community an understanding
of the counter-measure capabilities that the future generation
of miniature UAVs could be able to deploy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the adopted UAV based micro-motion model
that will be used in the paper. Section III derives the signal
model according to the described target model. In Section IV
the proposed deception system is introduced while Section V
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Fig. 1. Geometry of the radar and UAV, and top view of UAV. Overlaid is the
sub-reference coordinate system with origin at the target’s CM and its axis
rotations.
presents simulation results for different operating scenarios.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. UAV MICRO-MOTION MODEL
The platform of choice for this analysis is a quad-copter with
similar structure to a DJI Phantom 4 [15], while the examined
geometry is illustrated in Fig.1. The radar sensor is placed
at the axis origin, i.e. Xr = [xr, yr, zr] = [0, 0, 0]T while the
centre of mass of the UAV target is assumed in an arbitrary
positionXc = [xc, yc, zc]T . The the distance between the radar
and the target is therefore given by:
Rc = ||Xc|| (1)
where || · || denotes the euclidean norm. Additionally, α and
β indicate the azimuth and elevation angles of Xc. The top
view of the UAV is also shown in Fig.1 where the length of
the arm and the one side of the two-sided blade are indicated
by La and Lb respectively.
Without loss of generality, assume a sub-reference system,
Xˆ-Yˆ -Zˆ, with axis parallel to the main coordinate system,
X-Y -Z, and origin at Xc (see Fig. 1). The position of
each scattering point in the new sub-reference system will
depend on the targets morphological properties as well as
its orientation. The orientation of the target can be expressed
through three 3×3 rotation matrices, RX(ψ),RY (θ),RZ(φ),
accounting for the roll, pitch and yaw rotation angles re-
spectively [5]. Being outside of the scope of this paper, the
reader is referred to [5] for a complete formulation of these
rotation matrices. The initial position of the the j-th rotor in
the Xˆ-Yˆ -Zˆ is denoted as Xˆ0j while the position of any point
in the same system can be calculated as:
Xˆk = RZ(φ)RY (θ)RX(ψ)Xˆ
0
k (2)
where Xˆ0k is the position of the k-th point in the Xˆ-Yˆ -Zˆ
system.
Furthermore, assume four additional sub-reference coordi-
nate systems centred at the center of rotation of the four
double-bladed rotors Xˆ0j . In Fig. 2 one of the sub-reference
systems, X˜j-Y˜j-Z˜j , is shown along with the Xˆ-Yˆ -Zˆ axes.
Fig. 2. Target rotor blade (north-east) and overall geometry with the radar
signal under far-field assumption.
Accounting that the rotor blades can only exhibit rotation on
the Z˜ axis, the positions of the scattering points on the j-th
blade depend on their initial position and the yaw rotation
angle φj given by:
φj = Ωjt (3)
where Ωj is the rotation speed of the j-th rotor and t is the
time variable. Using (3), the rotation matrix RZ(φj) can also
be defined. Similar to (2), the position of an i-th arbitrary point
on the j-th rotor blade in the Xˆ-Yˆ -Zˆ system is given by:
Xˆi,j = RZ(φ)RY (θ)RX(ψ)[RZ(φj)X˜
0
i,j + Xˆ
0
j ] (4)
where X˜0i,j is the initial position of the scatterer at the
X˜j-Y˜j-Z˜j coordinate system.
Under the far-field assumption, the wave-front can be con-
sidered planar instead of spherical [16]. In Fig. 2 the examined
geometry is illustrated close to the target. As it can be seen,
the distance of a single point on the target from the radar can
be approximated as the distance Rc plus the relative distance
of the point to the wave-front plane passing from Xc. The
relative distance Rˆk (see Fig. 2) can be calculated as:
Rˆk =[RY (−β)RZ(−α)Xˆk]x
=xˆk cosα cosβ + yˆk sinα cosβ − zˆk sinβ (5)
where [·]x indicates the x component of the coordinates. This
distance can be ether positive or negative depending on if Xˆk
appears before or after the wave-front. The total distance from
Xˆk to Xr can be approximated as:
Rk ≈ Rˆk +Rc (6)
The distance in (6) will always be positive as Rc >> |Rˆk|.
Similarly, the distance Ri,j from Xˆi,j to Xr can be calculated
from (5) and (6) by replacing Xˆk with Xˆi,j .
III. SIGNAL MODEL
Assume a radar system periodically emitting a waveform
with complex envelope g(t) and carrier frequency fc. The
transmitted signal can be expressed as:
s(t, u) = g(t)e−j2pifc(t+u) (7)
where t is the fast time accounting for the time between
the beginning and the end of one pulse repetition interval
(PRI), i.e. t ∈ [T,PRI] where T is the duration of the signal,
while u accounts time intervals with duration of a PRI, i.e.
u = 0,PRI, 2PRI, ..., referred to as slow time. In the presence
of an arbitrary point scatterer m, after pulse compression and
carrier removal the signal at the receiver is given by:
rm(t, u) = am(u)hm(t, u)e
j2pifcτm(u) (8)
where am(u) is the amplitude modulation depending
on the radar cross section (RCS) of the scatterer,
hm(t, u) = g(t− τm(u)) ∗ g(−t) is the matched filter output
with “∗” denoting the convolution operator, and τm(u) is the
propagation delay due to the relative distance between the
radar and the scatterer.
As it can be seen in (8), the time delay is modelled slow-
time. Additionally, no Doppler shift is accounted in the fast
time as the target is not expected to noticeably change its
location during the period of a single pulse [16]. For better
understanding it should be also mentioned that h(t, u) contain
information related to the range resolution bin that the target
falls in the slow time while the complex exponential term is
associated with the Doppler of the target.
Accounting for all the target scatterers and the presence of
noise, the total received signal is expressed as:
r(t, u) =
K∑
k=1
rk(t, u) +
M∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
ri,j(t, u) + n(t, u) (9)
where M is the total number of rotor blades, N and K is
the number of scatterers on one blade and the main body
respectively, and n(t, u) is complex white Gaussian noise
CN (0, σ). Additionally, the returns rk(t, u) and ri,j(t, u) can
be calculated from (8) by replacing τm with τk = 2Rk/c and
τi,j = 2Ri,j/c respectively, where c is the speed of light and
the distances Rk and Ri,j are calculated from (6).
IV. DECEPTION SYSTEM
A. System Design
The block diagram of the proposed ECM system is illustrated
in Fig. 3. As it can be seen the complete system can be
separated in three main parts:
a) Interception: The interception sub-block is associated
with capturing and processing the radar signal with focus
on two main tasks. First, the receiver shall be the able to
perform source localisation operations in order to detect radar
sources and estimate their time and direction of arrival. This
task is of great significance in cases where false targets are
used in the jamming signal. High precision and accuracy are
even more important when micro-Doppler signatures are taken
into account. Furthermore, the interceptor shall be capable
of storing the received signal and identifying key design
parameters such as its carrier frequency, complex envelope
and PRI. Correct parameters estimation is very important
as they will dictate the design of the jamming signal. For
example, wrong estimation of the PRI might result in false
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the proposed ECM system.
targets rapidly changing position making them easier to be
discriminated and rejected by the radar.
b) Design: The design sub-block identifies the suitable
parameters for the jamming signal. Particularly, on-board sen-
sors will be utilised to extract the target’s state parameters such
as its velocity, orientation and rotors speed. Such parameters
will then be used to estimate the radar signature the target
will impose on the intercepted signal. Based on this signature,
the proper design characteristics will be then assigned for the
jamming signal. Particularly, parameters such as the Doppler
spread caused by the rotors can be used to design a jamming
signal able to completely cover the micro-Doppler signature
of the target. Furthermore, design of false targets could made
based on off-line or on-line generated radar signatures which
will then be used to update the characteristics of the deception
signal.
c) Modulation: In the modulation sub-block, the re-
ceived radar signal is modulated according to the parameters
identified from the interception and design blocks and is
then retransmitted. During this process three main modulation
are considered. First the translation modulation accounts for
changes in the envelope and phase of the signal to account for
changes in the location of the projected target. The Doppler
modulation will modify the phase of the signal in order to
indicate change in the velocity of the centre of mass of the
target. Lastly, the micro-Doppler modulation is associated with
the micro motion characteristics of the projected target.
B. Jamming Signal
Following the signal model discussed in Section III, the
jamming signal for a point target m can be expressed as:
qm(t, u) = aˆm(u)g(t− τˆm(u))e−j2pifc(t−τˆm(u)) (10)
where aˆm(u) and τˆm(u) are the designed RCS and delay
respectively. Assuming that the radar and jamming signal are
received and transmitted from the centre of mass of the target,
TABLE I
LINK BUDGET PARAMETERS
Platform Description Parameter Value
Carrier frequency [17] fc 1.255 GHz
Target RCS [18] σ 0.01 m2
Radar Transmitted power [18] PT 33 dBW
Min detectable power PD −40 dBW
Transmitter gain GT 9 dB
Processing gain [19] GP 19.5 dB
Integration gain GI 33.1 dB
Beamforming gain [17] GB 18 dB
Low noise amplifier gain GA 60 dB
Receiver gain GR 130.7 dB
Jammer Min detectable power PˆD −10 dBW
Receiver gain GˆJ 36 dB
from (5) it can be seen that to estimate τˆm(u) the jammer
needs the relative potion of m compared to the centre of mass
and the direction of arrival of the intercepted signal. Based on
(10) the jammer can generate simple, point like targets using
one scatterer or more complex targets by combining multiple
returns. When multiple returns are considered, proper RCS
parameter design is important as different components of the
target will induce returns of different intensities, playing a
significant role on the final signature.
C. Link budget
As the system is expected to operate under low size weight
and power (SWaP) restrictions, the maximum operation range
is highly dependent on the ability of the jammer to properly
intercept the radar signal and its ability to transmit a powerful
enough signal. Additionally, this range shall be longer or close
to the maximum detectable range that the radar offers for such
a target. The maximum detectable range RD for a monostatic
radar can be calculated through the radar equation:
RD =
4
√
PTGTGRλ2σ
(4pi)3PD
(11)
where PR transmitted power, GT and GR are the transmitter
and receiver of the radar, λ = c/fc is the wavelength of
carrier signal, σ is the total target RCS, PD is the minimum
power required for detection. As a case study, the Aveillant
Gamekeeper 16U is used with the chosen parameters being
summarised in Table I. Most of the parameters have been
drown from [17]–[19] while others have been fixed to offer
a maximum detectable range of approximately 5km [18]. The
transmitter gain is calculated as GT = 10 log10NT, where
NT = 8 is the number of transmitting elements [19]. More-
over, the processing gain is calculated as GP = 10 log10 TB,
where T = 30µs and B = 3MHz are the duration and
bandwidth of the radar pulse respectively [19]. The integration
gain is calculated as GI = 10 log10Np, where Np = 2048 is
the number of pulsed used for integration. For a pulse repletion
interval PRF = 7.5kHz it results to an integration time of
Fig. 4. Radar received power from target and jammer transmitted power for
a SIR = 0dB in different ranges.
0.28s [19]. The total gain of the receiver GR is calculated by
adding the processing, integration, beamforming and low noise
amplifier (LNA) gain. The maximum interception1 range RI
can be calculated as:
RI =
2
√
PTGTGˆRλ2
(4pi)2PˆD
(12)
where GR is the jammer receiver gain and PD is the minimum
received power required for successful interception. From (11)
and (12), and using the parameters in Table I, the maximum
detectable and interception ranges are given as RD = 4.82km
and RI = 5.37km respectively. Therefore, the target will be
able to detect the surveillance system approximately from a
distance of 0.5km before it gets detected.
Moreover the interference power introduced by the jammer
at the radar is given by:
PI =
PˆTGRλ
2
(4pi)2R2
(13)
where PˆT and GˆT are the transmitted power and gain of
the jammer respectively, and R is the distance between the
target and the radar. Rearranging (11), in Fig. 4 the received
power power by the radar from the target in different range
is shown by a black line, with a dashed line indicating the
maximum detectable range. Moreover using (13), the red line
shows the transmitted by the jammer power PˆT in order to
achieve a signal to interference (SIR) of 0dB. As it can be
seen, close to the detectable range, the jammer has to transmit
−62.5dBW which is also the maximum required power to
cancel the reflected signal.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Focusing on the micro-Doppler aspect of the target, only
returns from the blades are considered. The returns were
calculated based on a 3D model of the one side of the
blade illustrated in Fig.5. The model comprises 59 triangular
1The term interception is used to describe successful detection of the radar
by the jammer.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Scenario Parameter Sc. 1 Sc. 2
Carrier frequency fc 10 1.255 GHz
Pulse Repetition Frequency 1/PRI 284 7.2 kHz
Pulse width T 3.5 30 us
Bandwidth BW 10 3 MHz
Sampling frequency fs 100 45 MHz
Azimuth α 0 0 deg
Elevation β 5.7 2.2 deg
Target range Rc 500 1300 m
Drone Parameter
Blade length Lb 120 mm
Arm length La 175 mm
Rotation speed of blades Ω 733 rad/s
Number of rotors M 4
Number of scatterers on blade N 118
faces, each of which representing a scatterer. The RCS of
these scatterers is approximated using a Physical optics Facet
(POFACETS) prediction model [20]. The parameters used to
simulate each scenario are summarised in Table II, see Sc. 1
and Sc.2 for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 respectively.
A. Scenario 1
In the first scenario, a fixed position target is examined in an
X-band and high PRF configuration. While such a scenario
might not be representative for long range radars, here it is
examined to better access micro-Doppler profile of the target.
In Fig.6a the normalised spectrogram of the returns from only
one blade from the rotor is illustrated for two rotations. As it
can be seen when the blade is moving away from the radar the
signal exhibits negative frequency shift while moving towards
it results to positive Doppler. Moreover, the signal has different
profile depending on the side that the blade is facing the radar.
For comparison, the returns simulated using a mathematical
model for a rotating blade [5] are illustrated in Fig.6b. The
length and width parameters used in the model are similar
to the ones extracted by the 3D model. Comparing the two
profiles it can be seen that both have the same maximum
and minimum frequency shifts, with the mathematical model
Fig. 5. One side blade 3D model used for simulations.
(a) POFACETS, 1 Single-Blade (b) Mathematical, One-sided 1 Single-
Blade
(c) POFACETS, 4 Double-Blades (d) Mathematical, 4 Double-Blades
Fig. 6. Spectrogram of the return form Drone rotors simulated for Scenario 1
using the 3D model and POFACETS [20], and a mathematical model [5];
Hamming window of 0.7ms is used with 90% overlap.
having a pronounced envelope and similar profile for both
sides of the blade.
The spectrograms of all 4 double sided rotors are illustrated
in Fig. 6c and 6d using the POFACETS and theoretical model
respectively. As it can be seen the returns from the different
target components overlap in the total range-Doppler profile.
The phase of each of these micro-Doppler components will
depend on the initial position of the blades and the orientation
of the target. Comparing Fig. 6c and 6d it can be seen that
the mathematical model results to a fully symmetric micro-
Doppler signature along the zero Doppler axis, while the
POFACETS is asymmetric. Nevertheless, both cases exhibit
similar structure properties such as periodicity and maximum
Doppler shift.
B. Scenario 2
In the second scenario initially a stationary drone target is
simulated under L-Band and medium PRF configuration. In
Fig. 7 the spectrogram of the target returns using POFACETS
and theoretical model are illustrated for all 4 double sided
blades. Comparing the results with Fig. 6 it can be seen that
due to the lower PRF, the individual blade returns are less
distinguishable in this scenario. Additionally, since the carrier
frequency is also lower in Scenario 2 compared to 1, the
maximum Doppler shift has also been reduced. Furthermore,
comparing Fig. 7a and 7b it can be seen that both micro-
Doppler signatures exhibit very similar characteristics. The re-
spective Range-Doppler (RD) maps generated using a coherent
time interval of 0.1s are shown in Fig. 8. As it can be seen,
the mathematical model generates a RD profile very similar to
the one simulated using POFACETS. Particularly, small dif-
ferences in intensity of the different frequency component can
(a) POFACETS, 4 Double-Blades (b) Mathematical, 4 Double-Blades
Fig. 7. Spectrogram of the return form Drone rotors simulated for Scenario 2
using the 3D model and POFACETS [20], and a mathematical model [5];
Hamming window of 1.4ms is used with 90% overlap.
(a) POFACETS (b) Mathematical
Fig. 8. Range-Doppler map of the return form Drone rotors simulated for
Scenario 2.
be seen. It should be noted that such differences in intensity
will also appear if the initial position of the blades changes
and therefore cannot be used as discriminating characteristic
for the target.
Evaluating the results from both scenarios, it is demon-
strated that using a theoretical model and known operating pa-
rameters such as the rotors blades number, length and rotation
speed, the target’s micro-Doppler signature characteristics can
be estimated reliably by the deception system. Additionally,
in realistic operating scenarios, using relatively low carrier
frequency and PRF, a jammer could be able to generate ghost
Drone targets with very similar characteristics to a real target
by simply using the theoretical model.
VI. CONCLUSION
The presented work investigated the potential of ECM in small
UAV platforms. Particularly, the appropriate micro-motion
model was developed in order to derive a signal model that
predicts the micro-Doppler returns from a multirotor miniature
UAV target. The model is based on the far-field assumptions
and can be used by the jamming system to determine jamming
signal parameters such as maximum micro-Doppler shift or
generate complex false targets. Additionally, a structure outline
for a deception system was proposed in conjunction with
a link budget analysis discussing the feasibility and power
requirements of such systems. Lastly simulated results based
on POFACETS and mathematical models were generated to
demonstrate the capabilities of the proposed ECM system in
different scenarios. Future plans include the development of
the appropriate interception and design algorithms in order
to successfully identify the radar signal and generate the
appropriate jamming signal. They outcomes of the research
are aimed to help the future radar design to cope with the
next generation of drones.
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